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Aristotle on *Hybris* and Injustice*

Douglas Cairns

The argument of this chapter is (first) that *hybris*, as defined and discussed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, is or implies a defect of character, i.e. a vice, because the *Rhetoric*'s account presupposes the developed framework used in the ethical treatises to categorize such things. Second, I shall argue that this vice is a form of the "particular injustice" that is discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 5 and that this specific variety of particular injustice involves a way of going wrong about honour, in fact is a form of greed or acquisitiveness with regard to honour. This (I shall argue) reflects Aristotle's view of honour as an important non-material commodity that can be fairly or unfairly distributed, justly or unjustly pursued. Accordingly, this view of *hybris* as a kind of injustice, a variety of *pleonexia*, needs to be seen in the context of the role of *timê* in Aristotle's accounts of justice and equality in his ethics and politics more generally.

1. *Hybris* is (or involves) a form of vice

Aristotle's account of *hybris* in the *Rhetoric* (2.2, 1378b14–15, 1378b23–31) falls within his discussion of the *pathos* of anger, and more specifically of its cause, *oligôria*, of which *hybris* is one of the three kinds (1378b14–15). This statement is backed by a definition of *hybris*: "For *hybris* is doing and saying things at which the victim incurs *aischynê*, not in order that the agent should obtain anything other than the performance of the act, but in order to please himself" (1378b23–25).¹ *Hybris*, we are then told, requires the initiation of harm, and the pleasure of *hybris* lies in the thought of one's own superiority (b25–30). As I argued long ago, in response to Fisher's insistence that *hybris* denotes either a way of treating others or at most an intention to treat others in a certain way,² Aristotle regards the motivation that is necessary for *hybris* not merely as a wish to bring about a certain state of affairs or to affect a patient in a particular way, but also as the desire to please oneself by demonstrating one's own superiority. A victim is certainly required; but so are a subjective disposition, a view of oneself, and a motive that is ultimately self-referential.

It is, of course, important that Aristotle defines *hybris* in terms of its actualization in word and deed (a point to which we shall return). But it is clearly the motive that matters – as Aristotle himself makes clear at 1374a13–15: not every case of striking is a case of *hybris*, but only when one strikes for a reason, such as dishonouring the other person or pleasing oneself.³ The intention to dishonour the other party and the intention to obtain the pleasure of

feeling or appearing superior are complementary and intrinsically linked. This is a way of treating others which at the same time expresses a subjective attitude both towards others and towards oneself. Already it seems to be about the *balance* between one's own *timê* and that of others.

These last remarks on *hybris*, which come at the end of Book 1 and before Book 2's definition of the concept, belong in the context of a discussion of the forensic branch of oratory, which is concerned with acts involving an individual or a community as victim. *Hybris* is thus discussed not only as a cause of anger, but also as a kind of injustice. Accordingly, Aristotle discusses the motives, conditions, and circumstances of injustice, and gives a short account of what injustice, the subject-matter of forensic oratory, consists in. At 1.13, 1373b33–1374a15, his point is that any ascription of injustice to an agent depends on an assessment of his motivation; a bare description of an action, in external terms, is insufficient. Accordingly, some admit that they took but deny that they stole, or admit that they struck but deny that they committed *hybris*, and so on (1373b38–1374a6). These are disputes about what it is to be unjust or wicked and the opposite, and therefore about *prohairesis*, for wickedness and wrongdoing lie in the *prohairesis*, and terms such as *hybris* and *klopê* connote *prohairesis* (1374a6–13).⁴

Prohairesis is a technical term that is important in both ethical treatises (and the *Magna Moralia*) in the discussion of the various states of character that are classified as virtues or vices.⁵ It is discussed in particular detail, however, in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 3 (chapters 2–3) and in Book 6 (chapter 2), as well as in the corresponding sections of the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, where these exist (*EE* 2.10–11, *MM* 17–19). From these and other passages we learn that all actions that result from *prohairesis* are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions result from *prohairesis* (*EN* 1112a14–15, 1135b8–11, *EE* 1223b38–1224a7, 1226b34–36); and we learn that *prohairesis* follows (actual or implicit) deliberation in so far as it is a deliberative desire to perform actions which contribute to the ends set by the rational desire for the good.⁶ *Prohairesis* therefore requires a grasp of the end of one's conduct, and this grasp is supplied by a person's developed and settled state of character (*hexis*), whether virtuous or vicious. This means that in order for a *prohairesis* to be good, the agent must possess excellence of character, and, by the same token, excellence of character requires the exercise of *prohairesis* (the choice of the specific moral action for its own sake in the light of the person's overall conception of the end). It is in the *prohairesis* that we see virtue or vice, and the praise and blame that the presence or absence of virtue rightly attracts respond not to the act but to the *prohairesis*.⁷

Certain aspects of this picture are particularly relevant to the account of *hybris* in *Rhetoric* 1.13 and 2.2. First, the *Rhetoric* agrees with the *Ethics* that *prohairesis* is the mark of virtue or vice: “Wickedness and wrongdoing [*mochthêria* and *to adikein*] lie in the *prohairesis*, and such terms (e.g. *hybris* and theft) connote the *prohairesis*” (ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή, 1374a11–13). Second, *hybris* was defined as gratuitous insult, motivated by a desire not to achieve any ulterior purpose, but to obtain the intrinsic pleasure of demonstrating one’s own superiority through the dishonouring of another (1378b23–8; cf. 1374a13–15). *Hybris* is explicitly said to be a kind of action performed for its own sake, one which depends on *prohairesis*.

The reference to *prohairesis* at *Rhetoric* 1374a11–13 clearly presupposes the technical sense of that term. We see this from the context in which it occurs, because the entire discussion of *adikia* in *Rhetoric* 1.10–13 is clearly related to the account of justice and injustice in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.⁸ Accordingly, *to adikein* is defined as voluntary injury in contravention of the law (ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον, 1368b6–7); the criteria of the voluntary (knowledge and the absence of duress) are rehearsed (ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, b9–10, as at *EN* 5.8, 1135a15–b8); and voluntary action is distinguished from action on *prohairesis* (ὅσα μὲν οὖν εἰδότες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα, b10–12, as at *EN* 5.8, 1135b8–11).

Injustice in the fullest sense exists when the agent acts on *prohairesis*, and this is a sign of the possession of a vicious *hexis* (1374a9–13; cf. 1374b13–16). But acts of injustice can also be committed by those who do not possess this *hexis*, for example by those who act in anger (1373b33–8); and acts that harm others can be committed unintentionally, through ignorance of some relevant particular, or by pure accident (1374b4–10):

ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῇ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· [ἔστιν] ἀτυχήματα μὲν <γὰρ> ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν· τὰ γὰρ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας.

For those actions which should be excused are cases for *epieikeia*; errors [*hamartêmata*], unjust acts [*adikêmata*] are not to be assessed on an equal basis, nor are errors and misadventures [*atychêmata*]. Misadventures are all those things that are unexpected and do not arise from vice; errors are those that are not unexpected, yet do

not arise from vice; while unjust acts are those that are both expected and caused by vice, for acts committed because of desire arise from vice.

This is clearly a simplified version of the distinction in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.8 between *atychēmata*, *hamartēmata*, *adikēmata*, and “being an unjust person” (1135a5–1136a5), trailed in summary form at 5.6, 1134a17–23:

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

But since a person may commit injustice and not yet be unjust, what is it that distinguishes those unjust acts whose commission makes a person actually unjust in terms of each form of injustice, for example, a thief or a seducer or a robber? Or is this not what makes the difference? For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from *prohairesis* at all, but rather under the influence of passion. So he commits injustice, but he is not an unjust man – not a thief, though he has stolen, not a seducer, though he has seduced, and so forth.

One can actually commit an unjust act, and commit it intentionally, and yet still not be an unjust person; in order to be a thief or an adulterer a person must possess a settled disposition to choose the vicious act for its own sake, *qua* act of injustice. It is only in this last case that the agent acts with *prohairesis*. This means that if the act of *hybris* is to involve *prohairesis*, its dispositional aspect will be both much more substantial and much more particular than Fisher argued in 1992. It will demand more than a simple *intention* to dishonour another person (Fisher's claim), because such an intention is possible even in cases where no *prohairesis* is present. Aristotle is consistent in his view that *hybris* depends on *prohairesis*; and if that is so, then *hybris* is – or implies – a form of vice.⁹

2. *Hybris* is a form of particular injustice and so involves *pleonexia*

Aristotle's first expression of his view of *hybris* in *Rhetoric* 1.13 occurs, as we saw, in the context of a discussion of justice and injustice, and this already makes it clear that he sees *hybris* as a species of injustice: “in all such matters the issue is about being unjust or not being unjust” (*Rhet.* 1374a9–11). This is substantiated by explicit references to *hybris* as a type of injustice elsewhere – in the immediate context and elsewhere in the work.¹⁰ If *hybris* is a type of injustice, then the *hexis* from which it springs must be what *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 5

identifies as “particular injustice” (ἡ ἐν μέρει/κατὰ μέρος ἀδικία),¹¹ and we should be able to find out more about it from that context.

A crucial aspect of particular injustice is that, according to Aristotle, all its forms involve a kind of *pleonexia*, acquisitiveness or greed. This is a point upon which Aristotle lays considerable emphasis, first at 5.1, 1129a32–b11:

δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ’ ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰ γαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὗχονται καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ εὖχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ’ ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλεον αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ’ ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθὸν πῶς εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ’ ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.

Both the one who breaks the law and the *pleonektês*, the unfair [or ‘unequal’: *anisos*] person, seem to be unjust, so that it is clear that the law-abiding person and the fair person will both be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the equal [or ‘fair’, *ison*], and the unjust the illegal and the unequal [or ‘unfair’, *anison*]. Since the unjust person is a *pleonektês*, s/he will be unjust with regard to good things – not all good things, but those that are a matter of good and bad fortune. These are always good in the absolute sense, but not always for a particular individual. People pray for these and pursue them, but they shouldn’t; they should pray instead that the things that are good absolutely may be good for them too, but choose the things that are good for them. The unjust person does not, however, always choose the larger share: s/he actually chooses the smaller share of things that are bad without qualification; but because the lesser evil seems good in a way, and because *pleonexia* is of the good, s/he seems to be a *pleonektês*. What s/he is is unfair, for this includes and is common to both scenarios.

The emphasis continues in the next chapter (1130a14–22):

ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ’ οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι’ ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ’ οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ’ ἀδικίαν.

What we are investigating, however, is the particular justice which is a virtue, since, as we said, there is such a thing; and similarly with regard to injustice it is the particular sense that we are investigating. Here is a proof that it exists: in respect of the other vices the agent does wrong (*adikein*), but does not take more of anything, out of *pleonexia* (πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν) — for example, by throwing away one's shield, from cowardice, or abusing someone, from bad temper, or not lending money, from meanness; whereas when one takes more, out of *pleonexia*, it is often not a matter of any of these vices, much less all of them, yet it is a matter of vice (since we blame it), i.e. injustice.

It recurs in 5.6, 1134a32-4:¹²

ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν.

Where there is injustice (*adikia*), there is unjust action (*to adikein*), but where there is unjust action there is not always injustice: to act unjustly is to assign to oneself too great a share of things that are good without qualification and too small a share of things that are bad without qualification.

It is important to be clear that *all* forms of particular injustice are forms of *pleonexia*. This is true even of injustice in distribution¹³ or of the corrective justice of the judge (5.9, 1136b34–1137a4):¹⁴

εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλεον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἄγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἄγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν.

But if a judge knowingly judges unjustly, he too is taking more [*pleonektein*], either of *charis* or of *timōria*. Therefore a judge who judges unjustly for these motives has more, just as if one were to share in the crime [*to adikēma*]; for in fact one who issues a judgement over a piece of land on that basis one gets not land but money.

It is also important that *pleonexia* may focus on any of those goods that signify success or failure, good or bad fortune (εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, 1129b3). It thus covers desire not only for money, but also for *timē*, safety, and other things of that type (περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν ἢ εἴ τιτι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, 1130b2–3).¹⁵

At the same time, however, Aristotle's use of the term *pleonexia* here is an element in a strategy, employed consistently in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5, of using terminology drawn from the material economy to construct models of distribution, exchange, and rectification in both material *and* non-material spheres. We see this in 5.5 (1132b21–1133b28) on “proportional equality” and the role of money in making commodities commensurable and in enabling future

exchange. But for our purposes it is especially relevant in three passages. The first is *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.2 (1130a32–b5). Here particular injustice is distinguished from general injustice and said to be about a form of profit (*kerdos*) that is not solely material:

ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἡ εἴ τιτι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι’ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

Thus it is clear that there is another sort of injustice besides general injustice, i.e. particular injustice, called by the same name because its definition is in the same genus; for both take effect in one’s dealings with others, but while particular injustice is concerned with honour or money or safety – or whatever term there may be that encompasses all these things – and motivated by the pleasure that derives from the profit [*kerdos*], general injustice is about all the things that the virtuous person is concerned with.

The account that follows (in *EN* 5.4, 1132a9–19, 1132b11–20) of the arithmetic equality that is the subject-matter of rectificatory justice in transactions between individuals makes it clear that Aristotle is borrowing the notions of “profit” (*kerdos*) and “loss” (*zêmia*) from the sphere of voluntary economic exchange:

ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεον τὸ δ’ ἐλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεον τοῦ κακοῦ δ’ ἐλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

But [the judge] endeavours to make them equal by means of the loss [*zêmia*], taking away the profit [*kerdos*]. “Profit” is used in a general way in such cases, even if it would not be the proper word in some of them, for example in the case of an assailant, likewise “loss” in the case of the victim; but whenever the damage is measured, at any rate, the latter is called “loss” and the former “profit”. Accordingly, while the equal is a mean between more and less, profit and loss are at the same time both more and less in contrary ways, profit being more of the good and less of the bad and loss being the opposite; of these the equal, which we assert to be just, is, as we said, a mean, with the result that rectificatory justice would be the mean between loss and profit.

ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἐκούσιου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλεον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

These terms, “loss” and “profit”, come from voluntary exchange. For to have more than one's own is called making a profit, and to have less than one had at the start is called making a loss, as in buying and selling, and all other transactions in which the law has granted immunity; but when the result is neither an increase nor a decrease, but exactly what they had at the outset, they say they have their own and have made neither a loss nor a profit. Hence justice in involuntary transactions is a mean between profit and loss of a sort, namely having the same both before and after.

Similarly, at 5.5 (1133b29–1134a13), justice is a mean between excess and deficiency, having more (*pleon echein*) and having less, and any act of injustice involves the agent's having more and the victim's having less:¹⁶

τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἰρετοῦ πλεον αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τὸναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

What the unjust and the just are has been stated. From their definition it is clear that just behaviour is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for the former is to have too much and the latter to have too little. And justice is a kind of mean – not in the same

way as the other virtues are, but because it is related to a mean, while injustice is related to the extremes. And justice is that by which the just person is said to be capable of doing that which is just by *prohairesis*, and inclined, when distributing things between oneself and another, or between two others, not to give too much to oneself and too little to one's neighbour of what is choiceworthy, and vice versa in the case of what is harmful, but what is proportionately equal; and similarly when one is distributing between two people. Injustice, on the contrary, is similarly related to that which is unjust, i.e. an excess or deficiency of something beneficial or harmful that is disproportionate. Therefore injustice is excess and defect, because it deals in excess and defect – in one's own case, an excess of that which is beneficial without qualification and a deficiency of what is harmful, and in the case of others, though the result as a whole is the same, the deviation from proportion may be in either direction. In respect of the unjust act, having the lesser share is being wronged and having the greater share is doing wrong.

These passages make it clear that these expressions are being used in an extended sense; at 1132b11–18, in particular, Aristotle makes the point that *kerdainein* and *zēmiousthai* are terms borrowed from the voluntary exchange of buying and selling goods, in which profit and loss are legitimate. The relevance of these terms to the sphere of particular justice that is Aristotle's proper subject is that *kerdainein* is a name for having more (*pleon echein*) than one started with, while *zēmiousthai* means having less (1132b13–14). *Kerdainein* is the more specifically economic term, and *pleon echein* a more general expression, but still *pleon echein* is a quantitative notion, applicable to material exchange, that is being used to apply also in contexts in which the quantities concerned can be abstract and intangible.

Pleon echein and *pleonexia*, then, can have both strict and extended senses. This explains why *hybris* and *pleonexia* can sometimes be distinguished in the Aristotelian corpus, as they are (for example) at *Politics* 5.2–3, 1302a38–b10:

διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται σφίσι
αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους ὀρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ'
ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχὴν, διὰ
καταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὐξήσιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον δι' ἐριθείαν,
δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα, διὰ ἀνομοιότητα. τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα
ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ φανερόν· ὑβρίζοντων τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς
ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς

διδούσας τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν.

For people are stirred up against each other by reason of profit [*kerdos*] and honour [*timê*], not in order that they may acquire them for themselves, as has been said before, but because they see others – in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly – claiming a larger share [*pleonektountes*] of them. Other causes are *hybris*, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and in a different way bribing the electorate, slighting, pettiness, dissimilarity. Of these, the power possessed by *hybris* and *kerdos*, and their mode of causation, is almost obvious; for when those in office show *hybris* and *pleonexia*, people engage in faction, both against each another and against the constitutions that offer the opportunity to do so; and *pleonexia* arises sometimes from the private and sometimes from the communal.

Here *timê* and *hybris* (on the one hand) and *kerdos* (on the other) are two distinct causes of *stasis*, and *pleonexia* is (probably) concerned with property, whether private or communal.¹⁷

The same distinction is made in a passage from the post-Aristotelian *On Virtues and Vices* (1251a30–36):

ἀδικίας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἀσέβεια πλεονεξία ὕβρις. ἀσέβεια μὲν ἡ περὶ θεοῦς πλημμέλεια καὶ περὶ δαίμονας ἢ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατοικομένους, καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ περὶ πατρίδα· πλεονεξία δὲ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν αἰρουμένη τὸ διάφορον· ὕβρις δέ, καθ' ἣν τὰς ἡδονὰς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσιν, εἰς ὄνειδος ἀγαγόντες ἑτέρους, ὅθεν Εὐήνος περὶ αὐτῆς λέγει “ἥτις κερδαίνουσ’ οὐδὲν ὁμῶς ἀδικεῖ”.

There are three forms of injustice [*adikia*] – impiety [*asebeia*], *pleonexia*, and *hybris*. Impiety is transgression with regard to divinities or the dead, as well as parents and the fatherland; *pleonexia* is transgression with regard to contracts, and involves taking the difference in a way that is contrary to desert; and *hybris* is a way of obtaining pleasure for oneself by insulting others, which is why Evenus says of it that “it makes no profit and yet does wrong” [*adikein*].

Though the definition of *hybris* in *Rhetoric* 2.2 does not explicitly make precisely this point, its emphasis on the fact that *hybris* involves seeking nothing more than the pleasure of the act itself is in some ways similar to the point made by the author of *On Virtues and Vices*.

We can thus agree that *hybris* and material acquisitiveness are two different things, and that *pleonexia* is a common name for the latter. But the existence of the strict sense of *pleonexia* in no way rules out its use in an extended, non-material sense. And in fact that sense is also present even in the passage of the *Politics* quoted immediately above, for though that passage

begins by distinguishing *timê* and *kerdos* as motives, and ends by referring *pleonexia* solely to material goods, it also observes that people get worked up about *timê* and *kerdos* not because they want to acquire them for themselves, but because they see others exhibiting *pleonexia* in *both* those respects – διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ... ἀλλ’ ἐτέρους ὀρῶντες ... πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων (people are stirred up against each other by reason of *kerdos* and *timê*, not in order that they may acquire them for themselves ..., but because they see others ... *claiming a larger share* [*pleonektountes*] *of them*) (1302a38–b2). Even in distinguishing profit and honour as motives, *hybris* and *pleonexia* as vices, this passage acknowledges that there can also be *pleonexia* of *timê*. This chimes with the argument of the wider context, that *stasis* arises from the perception of unjust treatment, with regard either to the equality that one is being denied or to the inequality or superiority to which one feels entitled (*Pol.* 5.2, 1302a24–34). Here *pleonektein* (a26) and *pleon echein* (a27–28) are used of all the objects of *stasis*, i.e. ‘*kerdos*, *timê*, and their opposites’ (a31–32).¹⁸ The account of particular injustice as *pleonexia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* stands in a direct relation to this passage.

I emphasize this especially because of Ryan Balot’s insistence that *pleonexia* in Aristotle – “especially in the *Politics*” – is “focused on power and material goods, rather than on honor”.¹⁹ This is wrong, because it fails fully to acknowledge the extended sense in which Aristotle uses the term *pleonexia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (as well as the presence of that extended sense elsewhere, for example in the *Politics*). It is wrong also because that extension of the term’s sense is not an unimportant or merely *ad hoc* expedient: it is central to Aristotle’s account of particular justice and injustice, to his conceptualization of honour as an important non-material good (one that he describes as the goal of civic life, *EN* 1.5, 1095b23, the greatest of external goods, 4.3, 1123b20–21), and to his understanding of *hybris*, not just in the *Ethics*, but elsewhere.

But if Balot is wrong about the relation between honour, *hybris*, injustice, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*’ extended sense of *pleonexia*, it is even more significant that his approach also errs in driving far too great a wedge between honour and wealth, *hybris* and *pleonexia* (in its narrower, material sense), as factors in ethical and political behaviour. At several points in his book,²⁰ Balot argues that “Aristotle’s separation of the terms” *hybris* and *pleonexia* – a position for which he cites my 1996 article on *hybris* – is typical of a progressive tendency to see material acquisitiveness and the pursuit of honour as alternative sources of motivation in the development of Greek political thought from the Archaic to the Classical periods.²¹ This is not my subject in this chapter, and so I cannot discuss it at length. But it seems to me that

Aristotle is thoroughly in keeping with earlier currents of Greek political thought in regularly expressing the conviction that the pursuit of wealth cannot be wholly dissociated from the pursuit of esteem and social status. We see this in the presentation of *hybris* as a failing of the rich in particular,²² but we also have Aristotle's explicit word for it that power and wealth are regarded by some as choiceworthy precisely because people see them as a means to honour (EN 4.3, 1124a17–20):²³

αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ὧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

For power and wealth are choiceworthy because of the honour they bring – at any rate, those who have them wish to be honoured on account of them. A person to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence they [sc. *megalopsychoi*] are thought to be supercilious.

It is unfortunate that Balot's account obscures these links, especially because their existence constitutes an important continuity between Aristotelian and traditional Greek ethical and political thought (e.g. in connexion with the “archaic chain” that links wealth and good fortune to excess, greed, *hybris*, and disaster).²⁴ But it is unfortunate also because it flies in the face of modern research in a variety of disciplines which, like Aristotle and like much traditional Greek thought, emphasizes that material prosperity is intimately related to issues of status and social comparison.²⁵ Epidemiological and sociological studies, for example, suggest that the deleterious effects of inequality of wealth and income – at least in modern societies where absolute poverty is rare – are largely a function of the link between wealth and status, of what one's wealth and the things one can buy with it say about one's standing relative to others. There is substantial evidence to suggest that humans' concern for fairness in the distribution of material rewards is conditioned not only by material concerns, but by the concern for status. The concern for fairness that typically manifests itself in the well-known “ultimatum game” shows that human beings' attitudes to material gain and the distribution of material resources are conditioned by a sense of one's own worth, by the notion that it would be beneath one's dignity to accept an excessively unfair share, even of a windfall.²⁶ We dislike excessive material inequality because of its unfairness. The unfairness in question is in itself already a matter of the discrepancy between outcome and desert. But we also resent inequitable distributions of wealth and income because those who benefit from them seem regularly to believe that greater material success is a mark of superior worth as an individual and a member of society; their greed for more encompasses status as well as wealth and power. Here again,

Aristotle shows himself well aware of the phenomenon that Balot obscures. *Stasis*, he writes (*Pol.* 5.1, 1301a28–35), is typically driven by mistaken notions of equality and inequality: democrats seek to extend the equality they enjoy by virtue of their free-born status and claim equality in all other respects, while for oligarchs the converse is true – being unequal in material wealth they believe themselves to be unequal absolutely. Thus the rich seek to *pleonektein* (ὥς ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον, 34–35). The rich already have more in material terms (κατ’ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι, 32–33); the other qualities in which they (unjustly) *pleonektein* are not material.

3. Honour, wealth, good fortune, and *hybris*

To take this further, let us return to *hybris* and the vice that it expresses. We should first notice how closely the characteristics of particular injustice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* match those of *hybris* in the *Rhetoric*. This kind of injustice can be manifested in the distribution of goods, but also in the context of “involuntary transactions” in which an agent creates an unfair inequality between himself and a patient in respect of some good, whether by stealth or by force (*EN* 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9):

τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμός ἐγγυή χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δ’ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἄρπαγὴ πῆρσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

One kind of particular justice, and of that which is just in that respect, lies in the distribution of honour, money, or the other things that are divisible among those who share in the constitution (for in these things people may differ in having equal or unequal shares). The other kind is that which is corrective and operative in transactions. Of this there are two parts, for transactions may be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary transactions are things like selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire; they are called voluntary because the beginning of these transactions is voluntary. Of involuntary transactions some are furtive, such as theft, seduction, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves,

assassination, perjury; others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, insult.

Thus particular injustice can be concerned with honour, requires a specific victim, and can be manifested in words or in deeds, by physical assault (*aikeia*, 1131a8) or by verbal insult (*kakêgoria* and *propêlakismos*, 1131a9),²⁷ i.e. ‘doing or saying things whereby the sufferer incurs *aischynê*’ (*Rhet.* 1378b23–24). And just as the *hybristês* is motivated by desire for a particular kind of pleasure in the *Rhetoric*, so particular injustice seeks the pleasure that comes from the *kerdos* (δι’ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, *EN* 1130b4), the profit at another’s expense which is characteristic of the *pleonexia* that particular injustice involves.²⁸ Like *hybris* (οἱ γὰρ ἀντιπιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται, *Rhet.* 1378b25–26) particular injustice also requires the initiation of wrongdoing, and is not found in retaliation (ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιπιοῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, 1138a20–22).²⁹ Both *hybris* and particular injustice, then, involve taking the initiative in exalting oneself at the expense of others, for no other motive than the pleasure of the offence itself. *Hybris* meets the criteria for vicious action in the fullest sense – it springs from a settled disposition to choose the vicious course for its own sake, in so far as it is pleasant.³⁰

The fact that Aristotle thinks of *hybris* as a form of particular injustice also helps explain why he assumes that *hybris* must always have a victim – all forms of injustice are necessarily πρὸς ἕτερον,³¹ and, as a form of particular injustice, *hybris* must occur in “involuntary transactions” involving two parties. In addition, Aristotle’s discussion of “involuntary transactions” focuses on cases where correction will be forthcoming from a judicial source; similarly in the *Rhetoric* the reference to *hybris* in 1.13 is specifically related to the needs of the forensic orator (see esp. 1374a7–9). *Adikein* in Greek, we remember, means “commit an offence” as well as “be unjust”.

At the same time, *hybris* is not just a way of treating other people. As a way of treating other people that connotes vice and requires *prohairesis*, it requires a specific sort of motivation rooted in a developed state of character that leads people to enjoy unfairly pressing their own claims in the face of the legitimate claims of others. Aristotle’s emphasis on the agent’s attitude to his own honour is both apparent in the definition in *Rhetoric* 2.2 and necessary if *hybris* is to be a form of injustice, of the *pleonexia* that seeks more for oneself at the expense of others. The comparative nature of the concepts of *pleonexia* and particular injustice in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 5 isolates a fundamental feature of *hybris* – that as a way of going wrong about one’s own claim to honour it inevitably involves going wrong about the claims to honour of

others (and *vice versa*).³² This relational element of comparison and complementarity is also a fundamental feature of the concept of honour, in Aristotle, in Greek, and in general.³³

Even though *hybris* is, for Aristotle, always a particular way of treating another person, it is not the nature of the act or the effect on the honour of the patient that makes an act hybristic, but the motive, the *prohairesis* that expresses a developed state of character. Unlike other authors,³⁴ Aristotle does not explicitly refer to this state of character as *hybris*,³⁵ but still the disposition is not nameless: it is the state by virtue of which a person is called a *hybristês*. To be a *hybristês* is not just to be liable to commit hybristic acts; hybristic acts must be defined as those that the possessor of a particular *hexis* would perform. Since the *hexis* from which *hybris* springs is that of injustice in its narrower sense, this in itself allows us to pin down the typical characteristics of the hybristic agent to a certain extent. But other contexts provide further help.

Our best evidence comes in a handful of passages in which Aristotle discusses *hybris* as typical of particular kinds of character. The discussions of pity and fear in *Rhetoric* 2.5 and 2.8, for example, consider not only the dispositions that give rise to these emotions, but also those that do not. Both pity and fear require the notion that we are vulnerable to misfortune (1382b29–30, 1385b16–17); by contrast, those who believe that their current good fortune renders them invulnerable to vicissitude are disposed not to pity or to fear (1382b33–1383a3, 1385b19–21, 29–31), but, because they are *hybristai* (1383a2) and “in a hybristic condition” (1385b30–31), to *hybrizein* (1385b21). The hybristic disposition (*diathesis*) from which concrete expressions of *hybris* spring entails a blind over-valuation of oneself caused by the experience or the illusion of prosperity and good fortune.

The sketches of the characteristics of the young, the rich, and the powerful in the *Rhetoric* and *Politics* also consistently attribute the *hybris* of those groups to their failure to form an appropriate conception of their own worth in relation to the worth of others. The characterization of the young at *Rhetoric* 2.12 (1389a2–b12), for example, stresses their naiveté, their inexperience of misfortune, and their acute attachment to *timê*. When *hybris* enters this picture at 1389b7–12, it is with specific reference to acts of insult or mockery (their acts of injustice tend more towards *hybris* than to petty wrongdoing, and they are witty, since wit is educated *hybris*, b7–12),³⁶ but these acts spring from a particular type of character, one that lacks the experience that should set limits to self-confidence and self-assertion.

Being hybristic and arrogant is likewise one of the characteristics of the rich (2.16), since the acquisition of wealth creates the illusion that we possess all good things, and this is the basis of the disposition of being *hybristai* and *hyperêphanoi* (1390b32–1391a2):

τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἔπεται ἦθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν· ὑβρίζονται γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τὰγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται· ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμὴ τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ φαίνεται ὧν ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ).

The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are *hybristai* and arrogant – something happens to them as a result of the acquisition of wealth (for they are so disposed as to think that they possess all good things; and wealth, as it were, is a valuation of the worth of everything else, which is why it seems that one can buy everything with it).³⁷

As a result of this error, the rich have a false idea of their own worth and a misplaced confidence in their own good fortune (1391a1–14, especially 13–14: καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου εὐδαίμονος ἦθος <ἦθος> πλούτου ἐστίν, “in a nutshell, the character that belongs to wealth is that of a lucky fool”).

The *Politics* also recognizes the tendency of the excessively fortunate to become *hybristai* and commit *hybris* (4.11, 1295b6–11):

ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον <ὄντα>, ἢ τὰναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενῆ ἢ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· γίνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρίζονται καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν, τῶν δ’ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίνονται δι’ ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. For a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite – i.e. exceedingly poor or weak or lacking in honour – it is difficult to follow reason; for the former tend rather to become *hybristai* and large-scale villains, while the latter tend too much to petty crime and low-level villainy. For the cause of all acts of injustice is either *hybris* or malice.

Again, the specific reference of the noun, *hybris*, is to a type of unjust act (b10–11), but this is one that springs from a mistaken belief that *my* particular good fortune entitles me to a greater share of honour than it should. Similarly, at 7.15, 1334a25–28 we read that war compels men to be just and to show *sôphrosynê*, whereas enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in time of peace makes them *hybristai* (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον). War fosters a disposition of modesty and self-restraint, prosperity and peace one of over-confidence and self-assertion. To possess the disposition that is necessary for *hybris* is thus to have a particular mistaken view of who you are, how things are going for you, and how likely this is to continue.

In the first of these *Politics* passages (4.11, 1295b8–9) it is the absence of reason that explains the mistaken attitude to good or bad fortune. The same point is made at *EN* 4.3, 1124a26–b6:

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὃ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

But instances of good fortune [*eutychēmata*] also seem to conduce to *megalopsychia*; for the well-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are thought worthy of honour, because they are in a position of superiority, and everything that is superior in some good is more highly honoured; so that even such things [sc. *eutychēmata*] make people more *megalopsychos*, because they are honoured by some people. But in reality only the good man is to be honoured, but anyone who has both [virtue and good luck] is thought more worthy of honour. Those who possess goods of that sort without virtue, on the other hand, are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, and are not properly called *megalopsychoi*, since these things cannot exist without complete virtue. Those who possess goods of that sort also become supercilious and *hybristai*; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune properly; being unable to bear it, and thinking themselves superior to the rest, they despise them, and act at random. They imitate the *megalopsychos* without being really like him, and do this in those aspects in which they are able: they cannot perform the actions that he performs out of virtue, so they just look down on other people. For the *megalopsychos* is justified in looking down on other people — his estimates are correct; but the majority do so at random.

The *megalopsychos* has the right attitude to *timê* and the goods for which people receive *timê*; others who enjoy the same external advantages, but lack virtue, are wrong in thinking

themselves worthy of great things and should not be called *megalopsychoi*. These people instead become supercilious (*hyperoptai*) and *hybristai*, because without *aretê* it is hard to deal appropriately with good fortune; unable to bear their good fortune and thinking themselves superior they despise others and do whatever they please. In this they resemble the *megalopsychos*, but his contempt for others is rational where theirs is not. To be a *hybristês* one's contempt for others must be based on a mistaken conception of one's own worth and a failure to distinguish luck from desert. I think we all know such people; sometimes it seems as if entire sectors of society consist of them alone.

Aristotle's definitions of *hybris* presuppose a reference to a source of motivation which provides the crucial criterion for differentiating a hybristic act from an apparently similar non-hybristic act. *Pace* Fisher (1992), these dispositional factors are not mere concomitants or conditions, but characteristics of the *hexis* that is necessary for *hybris*. To be a *hybristês* is not just to possess a drive, tendency, or intention to commit hybristic acts, but to entertain a misguided and inflated conception of oneself and one's place in the world. The *hexis* involved in being a *hybristês*, then, is a vice, in Aristotle's strict sense of the term.

4. Conclusions

Hybris is fundamentally about honour; but honour is an inclusive concept for Aristotle, as in Greek in general. Rather like "demeanour" and "deference" in Erving Goffman's celebrated account of social interaction,³⁸ *timê* presupposes bidirectional negotiations of esteem and self-esteem. Though Aristotle himself generally prefers to see *timê* as the esteem one receives from others (typically using the term *axia* for the agent's subjective claim to that esteem),³⁹ ordinary Greek uses *timê* for both the expression of esteem and for the quality that attracts it. The *timê* that Poseidon says was shared equally between each of the three divine brothers, Zeus, Hades, and himself, in the *Iliad* (15.185–93) consists in the prerogatives and the freedom of action that each exercises in his specific domain; the *timê* or *timai* that are allocated by Zeus to the various divinities in Hesiod's *Theogony* have a similar sense.⁴⁰ 'Prerogative', 'status', or 'office' are regular meanings of the term – the *timai* that were the offices of the Athenian state both expressed the esteem in which the individual was held and constituted a claim to that esteem.⁴¹ This is a sense that Aristotle himself confirms in *Politics* 3.10, 1281a31–2;⁴² indeed it is sharing in *timai* – in the sense of prerogatives, privileges, and offices – that he describes as the mark of a citizen at *Politics* 3.5, 1278a35–36 (λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν).⁴³ The bidirectionality (of demeanour and deference, claims and their recognition) thus presupposed in ancient Greek concepts of honour is

apparent in the way that *aidôs* focuses on the honour of both self and other.⁴⁴ But it is there, too, in Aristotle's notion of *hybris* as a form of *pleonexia*, for the *pleonexia* that is entailed by particular injustice in the sphere of honour involves precisely the failure to strike the appropriate balance between one's own honour and that of others. It is very important indeed that Aristotle believes that there is an economy of esteem,⁴⁵ and even more so that he thinks that this is an economy that can, in theory, be justly regulated and operated. If there can be injustice in the negotiations, transactions, and distributions of honour, then individuals have rights to respect and esteem, just as they have rights to their property. These are aspects of Aristotle's thought which scholarship has barely begun to explore.⁴⁶

One other conclusion that we might draw from Aristotle's handling of the concept of *hybris* is that the *timê* on which *hybris* rests also implies a great deal about a person's sense of his or her place in the world. *Hybris* is about how one projects oneself and one's own claims to others' respect, as well as about one's failure to show proper respect for others. But, over and above that, in everything that Aristotle says about the failure of the *hybristês* to realize that he is fallible, vulnerable, and subject to the same shifts in fortune as afflict everyone else, we see notions that reach very far back in traditional Greek thought, notions that define the human condition in a world of change and uncertainty.⁴⁷

As we saw, Aristotle's discussion of *hybris* in the *Rhetoric* reflects the needs of the forensic orator. This account is deepened in the *Nicomachean Ethics*' discussion of *hybris* as a form of particular injustice. Both of these discussions reflect the fact that, in Athenian law, *hybris* was a form of injustice, something that requires its actualization in word and deed.⁴⁸ One (but only one) aspect of this is the effect that *hybris* has on the honour of the victim. But in making it clear, in these same discussions, that *hybris* is also about the honour of the perpetrator, as well as in the emphasis that he places on the links between *hybris* and mistaken attitudes to good fortune, Aristotle also encompasses a much wider tradition of ancient Greek ethical and political thought, and successfully captures the inclusivity of *hybris* as a subjective, vicious disposition as well as an inappropriate way of treating others.⁴⁹

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Endnotes

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¹ Translating τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν (A; Ross, Kassel), rather than τὸ βλέπτειν καὶ λύπειν as in some later MSS (and earlier editions). I follow Cope 1877, ii.17 and Fisher 1992, 8 in the interpretation of the phrase, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο, ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο.

² Cairns 1996, discussing Fisher 1992.

³ οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔνεκά του, οἶον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. For corroboration of this in forensic oratory, see e.g. the well-known passage at D. 21.72: οὐ γὰρ ἡ πληγὴ παρέστησε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀτιμία· οὐδὲ τὸ τύπτεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐστὶ δεινόν, καίπερ ὄν δεινόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφ' ὕβρει. πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἐνὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιθ' ἐτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης. ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ' ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν, ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι. οὐδεὶς ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτ' ἀπαγγέλλον δύναιτο τὸ δεινὸν παραστήσαι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ πράγματος τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ τοῖς ὀρώσιν ἐναργεῖς ἢ ὕβρις φαίνεται.

⁴ 1.13, 1373b33–1374a15: ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ρηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἶον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕβρισαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δεοί ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρισθαι, τί κλοπῇ, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλόμεθα δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζον τὸ δίκαιον. ἐστὶ δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἁδίκον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἁδίκον [ἢ] ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαίρεσει ἢ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἁδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἶον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπῇ.

⁵ See EN 3.2–3 (cf. EE 2.10–11, MM 17–19) and 6.2. Ross 1949, 200 distinguishes a “technical sense” of *prohairesis* (relating to means) in EN 3.2 and 6.2 from its supposed use elsewhere to mean “purpose” (relating to ends), but see Sorabji 1980, 202–204. For various views on *prohairesis* (none fundamentally incompatible with the argument of this paper), see (e.g.) Kenny 1979, 69–107; Sorabji 1980, 201–5; Hutchinson 1986, 88–107; Sherman 1989, 79–94, 106–116; Broadie 1992, 78–82, 232–60; Broadie and Rowe 2002, 42–46; Pakaluk 2005, 129–136; Taylor 2006, 85–87, 150–155, 158–159; Frede 2011, 19–30; Bobzien 2014; Lorenz 2009, esp. 184–192; Merker 2016; Müller 2016; Price 2016.

⁶ Follows deliberation (EN 1112a15–1113a14, EE 1226a20–b30, 1227a5–18), but not necessarily *actual* deliberation (EN 1117a17–22). It is a deliberative desire (EN 1113a10–11, 1139a22–b5, EE 1226b2–20), a choice of τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη (EN 1112b11–1113a14, 1113b3–4, EE 1226a7–13, 1226b9–20, 1227a5–18), the *telos* being set by *boulêsis* (EN 1113a15–b3, EE 1226a13–17, EE 1227a28–31, 1227b37–1228a2; cf. EN 1142b28–33 on *euboulia*).

⁷ *Prohairesis* requires a *hexis* (EN 1139a33–5), and it is excellence of character that makes the *prohairesis* right (EN 1144a20; cf. 1145a4–5, EE 1227b34–1228a2). Virtue requires *prohairesis* (EN 1106a3–4, 1110b31, 1111b5, 1117a5, 1127b14, 1134a17–23, 1135b25, 1139a22–6, 1144a13–22, 1145a2–6, 1157b30, 1163a22, 1178a34–b1, EE 1227b1–5), as does vice (EN 1110b31, 1135b25, 1146a32, 1146b22–3, 1148a4–17, 1150a19–21, 1150b29–30, 1151a6–7, 1152a4–6). Both virtue (EN 1105a32, 1144a13–20) and vice involve choosing the action for its own sake in the light of one's view of *eudaimonia* (e.g. 1127a26–b17). Thus praise and blame focus not on the act but on the *prohairesis* (EN 1111b6, EE 1228a2–18).

⁸ That the treatment of justice and injustice is concluded by a discussion of *epieikeia* (1.13, 1374a26–b23; cf. EN 5.10, 1137a31–1138a3) is another sign that the framework of the EN is being applied.

⁹ To be sure, ‘intention’ (or ‘design’) is the translation of *prohairesis* preferred by Merker 2016, 272–82, but her discussion shows full awareness of the specifics of the concept in Aristotle's ethical theory.

¹⁰ E.g. *Rhet.* 1373a34–35 (people readily commit injustices ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἶον γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς); 1389b7–8 (καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν [sc. οἱ νέοι] εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ κακουργίαν); 1391a18–19 (καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν [sc. οἱ πλούσιοι] οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕβριστικά, τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἶον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν). Cf. also [Pl.] *Def.* 415e12; [Arist.] *De Virt.* 1251a30–6.

¹¹ See in general EN 5.1, 1129a32–b11, 5.2, 1130a14–b18, 5.2–4, 1130b30–1132b20, and *passim*).

¹² Cf. *pleon echēin* (vel sim.) at 1131b19, 1132b3, 1132b13, 1133b13, 1133b31, 1136b16, 1136b18, 1136b26, 1138a30; also 1133b30–1134a13 in general on the excess taken by the unjust agent and the deficiency imposed on the victim.

¹³ EN 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9, discussed below.

¹⁴ Something that Williams (1980, 192–193) describes as ‘a desperate device’ and ‘nonsense’, expressing the view that “There must be something wrong in extending *pleonexia* to cover someone’s getting more of this kind of thing.” Be that as it may, it is undeniable that Aristotle does indeed so extend it.

¹⁵ Cf. EN 9.8, 1168b15–23: there is a form of *pleonexia* involved in (vulgar) *philautia* that is similarly concerned with *timai* and pleasure, as well as with money.

¹⁶ Cf. again 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9 in general (discussed below).

¹⁷ See Miller 1995, 282–283.

¹⁸ Cf. Miller 1995, 295.

¹⁹ Balot 2001: 64 n. 21, endorsed by Mantzouranis 2012: 51 n. 41.

²⁰ Balot 2001: 92 n. 105, 106 n. 12. Cf. p. 104: “it is significant that later classical thinkers such as Aristotle emphasized the connection between *hubris* and greed far less than the associations between greed and distributive justice”. But if *hubris* is a type of *pleonexia* for Aristotle that distinction collapses.

²¹ Balot is thus a ‘progressivist’ in his approach to honour: for criticism of this approach in general, see Cairns 2011a; for Balot’s version of it across his oeuvre, see Canevaro 2018a. For the alleged chronological development in the distinction between wealth or power and honour as motives, see e.g. Balot 2001: 92–94 on Solon, 102–106 on Herodotus, 157–159 on Thucydides. Throughout his book, Balot consistently begs the question in assuming material senses for objectives and motives that often encompass the non-material (esp. honour and status). There are too many examples to cite, but see e.g. pp. 87 (*geras* in Sol. 5.1–6 W and in Homer), 110–111 (on Hdt. 7.149.3), 138–139 (on *pleonexia* and *philotimia* at Thuc. 3.82.8), 158–159 (on Thuc. 3.45.4–5). Here he writes (p. 159): “For Thucydides what is primary is the desire to have more, as a conceptual category in its own right. This desire was associated with other ideas, notably hope and overconfidence after success, but in itself desire was the fundamental drive behind Athenian imperialism.” In a footnote on the same page (n. 56), he goes on: “Fisher’s attempt (1992, 401–11) to view the Sicilian expedition as an act of *hubris* can be justified in that the expedition would not have been undertaken without feelings of over-confidence and without a desire to inflict humiliation on the Sicilians in order to demonstrate Athenian superiority, but, as I will show, the primary thrust driving the expedition was Athenian desire to get more.” But this presupposes that “desire” for “more” must be intrinsically and exclusively material; the evidence that Balot himself cites gives no warrant at all for this, but in fact supports the opposite view. The question is always ‘more of *what*?’ (See also Hdt. 7.16a, in n. 23 below.)

²² E.g. in the definition of *hubris* in *Rhetoric* 2.2, quoted above (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὕβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἶονται ὑβρίζοντες, 1378b28–29); cf. the discussion of the characteristics of the rich at 2.16, 1390b33–34 (ὕβρισταί γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου).

²³ But if the rich seek wealth in order to obtain esteem, so, in turn, those who seek esteem do so in order to convince themselves that they are good: EN 1.5, 1095b26–28; cf. 4.3, 1123b35, 8.14, 1163b3–4.

²⁴ See esp. Solon 4. 34–35 W, with Fisher 1992: 72; cf. 206, 213, 221, 236ff. For the traditional linkage of ‘thinking big’, *hubris*, and *pleonexia*, see e.g. Artabanus’ representations of Xerxes’ plan to invade Greece at Hdt. 7.108–ε, 7.16a, 7.18.2–3 (with Cairns 1996, 13–15). Balot (2001, 106) would have us believe that this presentation reflects “older” currents of thought in Herodotus that sit alongside newer ones (in which “greed is considered rather in terms of distributive unfairness”) that prefigure Aristotle’s “separation” of *hubris* and *pleonexia*. Again, a question is begged: why do we care about unfairness?

²⁵ See Brennan and Pettit 2004; Marmot 2004; Layard 2005, esp. 41–48, 150–153; Wilkinson 2005; Frank 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Dorling 2010.

²⁶ See e.g. Thaler 1988; Nowak, Page, and Sigmund 2000. The claim that we share this trait with other primates (Brosnan and De Waal 2003; Brosnan, Schiff, and De Waal 2005) has been disputed (Bräuer, Call and Tomasello 2006; Jensen, Call, and Tomasello 2007), but there is no doubt that the link between rank and psychophysical well-being, at least, is as strong in primates and other mammals as it is in human beings (Wilkinson 2005, 71–75, 87–89, 163, 268–271).

²⁷ According to Ammonius (*De adfin. vocab. diff.* 20; cf. Fisher 1992, 53 n. 52) *hybreis* are distinguished from *aikeiai* by the fact that *propēlakismos* is necessary for the former; on *propēlakismos* and *hybris*, cf. Fisher 1992, 44 n. 31, 48, 93, 107.

²⁸ Cf. Irwin 1988, 426, 429 and 624 nn. 4–6. The *kerdos* (the inequality) that particular injustice creates, the disparity in honour that *hubris* creates, and the pleasure of being unjust/hybristic for its own sake are thus intrinsic motives (as opposed to the extrinsic motive that might lead one to commit a superficially similar act of injustice as a means to some further or different end). This is to say that the inequality (the *kerdos* that is the inequality in honour and the pleasure that comes with it) that *hubris* creates is not an extrinsic, further end, but the intrinsic aim of the hybristic act, *qua* expression of the *hexis* of particular injustice.

²⁹ Cf. *Rhet.* 1379a30–35 on (reactive) anger as a response to (gratuitous) *hybris*; also 1402a1–3, where physical violence only qualifies as *hybris* when the assailant is the one who started it.

³⁰ This also answers to a typical feature of *hybris* in ordinary usage, in which to say that someone acted “not out of *hybris*, but . . . [for some further motive]” is to deny acting “just for badness/for the hell of it”, as a demonstration of one’s insolent disregard for law or convention; see (e.g.) *Lys.* 7.13; cf. *Thuc.* 4.95.8, *Xen. Anab.* 5.5.16, *Dem.* 21.181–182; Fisher 1992, 49, 98, 103.

³¹ *EN* 5.1, 1129b25–1130a13; cf. 1130b20; 1130b1–5.

³² See in greater detail Cairns 1996.

³³ See Cairns 1993, 2011a.

³⁴ See Fisher 1992, 125, 242, 281, 493. Arist.’s account of *hybris* thus resembles his discussions of *aidōs* in not acknowledging that *hybris*, like *aidōs*, can be the name of a disposition; see Cairns 1993, 393–431.

³⁵ The only instance I can find in the Arist. corpus of *hybris* used as the name of a character trait is in the post-Aristotelian *Oec.* (1344a35–b1).

³⁶ καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν (τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακία τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστε ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς), καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ φιλευτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. Contrast the old at 2.13, 1389b13–1390a28, esp. 1390a17–18: καὶ τὰδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν.

³⁷ We should note the affinity between this passage and the account of oligarchic motivation in *Pol.* 5.1 (section 2 above, ad fin.).

³⁸ See Goffman 1967.

³⁹ E.g. *EN* 4.3, 1123b23–24, *Pol.* 3.5, 1278a19–20, *Rhet.* 1.7, 1365a7–8.

⁴⁰ *Hes. Th.* 71–74, 112, 203–204, 421–422, 452, 462, 490–491, 881–885, 892–893; cf. *Hdt.* 1.118.2, 2.53.2.

⁴¹ For *timē* as ‘office’ at Athens see (e.g.) *Hdt.* 1.59.5, *Pl. Ap.* 35b1–3. Cf. *Hdt.* 2.65.3, 6.66.3 (priesthood); 3.34.1 (king’s wine-pourer); 1.91.1, 4.155.2, 4.162.1–2; 7.8a.2, 7.104.1 (kingship).

⁴² τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ’ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους (for we say that offices are *timai*, but if the same people are always in office the others are necessarily without *timē*). Cf. *timē* as the office/dignity of a king in *Pol.* 5.10 (1310b36, 1313a13).

⁴³ I think this is not just about offices (*pace* Riesbeck 2016, 193). Cf. (e.g.) *Hdt.* 4.145.4, where *timai* are the privileges and prerogatives that come with membership of the citizen community at Sparta.

⁴⁴ Cairns 1993.

⁴⁵ Anticipating, at least in outline, Brennan and Pettit 2004.

⁴⁶ But see Rabbås 2015. For (occasional and undeveloped) thoughts that support the conclusions in the text above (as far as the *Politics* is concerned), see Miller 1995, 101, 158–159, 266, 281–283, 295–296, 303; disappointingly little in Inamura 2015 (but see pp. 202–203) or Riesbeck 2016.

⁴⁷ This is a complex of thought that I have discussed before, in Sophocles (Cairns 2006), in Bacchylides (Cairns 2011b), and in Greek literature more generally (Cairns 2014). Cf. also Cairns 2013, 2016.

⁴⁸ On the authenticity of the law on *hybris* as paraphrased in Aesch. 1 and D. 21 (though not of its text as given at Aesch. 1.16 or at D. 21.47), see E. M. Harris in Canevaro 2013, 224–231. For an account of the law’s provision regarding *hybris* towards slaves that is fully in keeping with the argument of this paper, see Canevaro 2018b.

⁴⁹ There is an account of *timē* and wealth as external goods in Aristotle’s ethical thought, and of the relation between Aristotle and traditional Greek thought on these matters, in Mantzouranis 2012, but it has (at pp. 81–83) relatively little to say about *hybris* and does not pursue the affinities between Aristotelian and traditional thought on the interplay of wealth/prosperity, status, and fortune in the ways that human beings fail in their efforts to achieve *eudaimonia*.